Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A North Carolina social services department received a tip that Michael had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with his four-year-old stepdaughter. Michael and his family subsequently moved to Kentucky, where Family Services told detectives that Michael was possibly sexually abusing the children. All three children were placed into foster care.Before each interview, Michael received and waived his Miranda rights. He admitted to touching “between [Dorothy’s] legs and in her vagina area.” The detectives later said: “You’re going to continue to not have any contact with your children just until you admit to everything.” Michael said that he’d “like to talk to a therapist or something other than social services.” The detectives continued, saying: “You’re going to continue the rest your [sic] life without seeing your children because you want to bottle this up.” During a second interview, Michael admitted to multiple acts of sexual abuse that he had previously denied.Michael unsuccessfully moved to suppress the incriminating statements as coerced under “Miranda.” The Kentucky Supreme Court found that four of the officers’ statements “were delivered in a threatening manner” but noted that Michael had already admitted to three instances of sexual abuse. That court, the federal district court, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Michael v. Butts" on Justia Law

Cincinnati police responded to a “shots fired” call..A witness provided a video recording of the incident. The person in the video said that White had pointed a gun at his face and demanded his property. Police observed White enter a vehicle being driven by someone else, performed a traffic stop, found the driver in possession of a firearm, and found a loaded firearm under White's seat. White pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and agreed that he had “at least two convictions for crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1. The parties did not agree on the applicability of ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)’s 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence for armed career criminals. In 2005, White had been adjudicated guilty of aggravated robbery with specifications for firearm possession and firearm facilitation, in Juvenile Court; in 2009, White pleaded guilty to six counts of aggravated robbery (occurring on two different dates), with specifications for having a firearm on or about his person while committing the offenses, and for possessing, displaying, brandishing, or using a firearm to facilitate the offenses.The Sixth Circuit vacated White’s 180-month sentence. The district court plainly erred in finding that White’s aggravated-robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies. The underlying theft offenses were not identified nor shown to have as an element the knowing or purposeful “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

In 2014, EMS entered into a payment processing agreement with Procom, a business owned by Gaal that sold historical tours. The Agreement was executed by Gaal, who signed a personal-guaranty provision. It contained terms relating to “chargebacks,” which occurred when a Procom customer’s transaction was declined or canceled after EMS had credited Procom’s account for the purchase; EMS repaid the money to the Procom customer, then charged Procom for that money plus a fee. In 2019, EMS and Procom executed a second agreement, which contained an explicit integration clause; the guaranty provision was not signed by Gaal but by another Procom employee. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many customers canceled purchases with Procom, resulting in $10 million in chargebacks. Procom is involved in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. EMS filed a creditor’s proof of claim and sued Gaal. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding that the 2019 Agreement superseded the 2014 agreement “in all material respects,” including replacing Gaal’s guaranty.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, upholding the district court’s consideration of the bankruptcy filing for purposes of determining when chargebacks occurred and its finding that the 2019 Agreement replaced the 2014 Agreement rather than merely supplementing it. The court reversed in part, holding that any chargeback related to transactions occurring before the execution of the 2019 Agreement arose under the 2014 Agreement. View "Electronic Merchant Systems LLC v. Gaal" on Justia Law

Milman worked as an attorney at Fieger. On March 13, 2020, all schools and daycare facilities closed due to COVID-19. Fieger began exploring remote work. Milman was scheduled to work from home on Wednesday, March 18. Over the weekend, Milman e-mailed Harrington, a partner at the Firm, requesting to work from home on Monday and Tuesday. She noted that her children’s daycare facility was closed and her concerns about her son’s heightened vulnerability to COVID-19 as a result of his bout with RSV—a dangerous respiratory infection that put him in the hospital for five days. Harrington advised her to take paid time off (PTO) on those two days. On Monday, Governor Whitmer issued an executive order that banned gatherings of more than 50 people. Milman’s son developed symptoms resembling COVID-19. She contacted Human Resources and offered to take unpaid leave. HR responded that she could work from home for the remainder of the week. Later that day, HR e-mailed Milman a letter, signed by Fieger, that terminated her employment for failure to come into work on Thursday.Milman sued, alleging violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601(b)(1)–(5). The district court dismissed Milman’s FMLA claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Milman’s request for leave was protected—even if she ultimately was not entitled to it. Milman plausibly attempted to engage in the process contemplated under FMLA. View "Milman v. Fieger & Fieger, P.C." on Justia Law

Hitch pleaded guilty to theft of multiple firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(u), and illegally possessing firearms after having previously been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). His plea agreement recommended the application of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) for the number of firearms involved and an enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because Hitch possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The parties preserved their rights to present arguments about the application of 2K2.1(b)(4)(A)’s stolen-firearm enhancement. The PSR recommended grouping both counts together, applying both the 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) and 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancements, and the application of the stolen-firearm enhancement. Hitch argued that its application resulted in double counting.The district court adopted the PSR’s findings and calculations. Hitch’s Guidelines range was 46-57 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 51-month sentence. There was no double counting. Hitch’s two counts were grouped together, and the offense level was calculated based on his felon-in-possession count, which produced a higher offense level. His base offense level was not increased by the 922(u) violation; there was no multiple-count adjustment. The section 922(u) offense conduct is reflected in the Guidelines calculation only through the enhancements. View "United States v. Hitch" on Justia Law

In May 2020, Koballa died of COVID-19. Hudak, the executrix of Koballa’s estate, sued, asserting negligence and related state-law claims against Elmcroft, an assisted-living facility. Elmcroft removed the case to federal court under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), and the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), based on arguments it made under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP), 42 U.S.C. 247d-6d.The district court found that the PREP Act did not provide grounds for removal under either removal statute and remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Hudak does not allege that Elmcroft engaged in willful misconduct in the administration or use of a covered COVID-19 countermeasure, so the PREP Act does not “provide[] the exclusive cause of action for the claims” and does not completely preempt Hudak’s state-law claims. Hudak’s state-law claims do not arise under federal law and could not be removed. Elmcroft is not a "federal officer"; it operated a facility that came under significant federal regulation as part of the federal government’s COVID-19 response but did not have an agreement with the federal government, did not produce a good or perform a service on behalf of the government, and has not shown that the federal government exercised control over its operations to such a degree that the government acted as Elmcroft’s superior. View "Hudak v. Elmcroft of Sagamore Hills" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services supervises Tennessee’s foster care system, subcontracting much of its day-to-day work to private foster care agencies, including Omni. In 2016, Mikel took custody of “AK,” then 12 years old, and “SK,” then nine years old, as a foster parent. Mikel says that she had planned to adopt the girls. Omni approved Mikel’s home as a foster home and oversaw Mikel’s relationship with the girls. In 2017, when Mikel submitted her adoption papers, Omni removed the girls from Mikel’s custody, alleging emotional abuse. Mikel says that she never abused the girls, that Omni’s removal was pretextual and in violation of Tennessee law, and that neither Omni nor the Department gave her notice or an opportunity to be heard before commencing the removal process.After unsuccessfully appealing Omni’s removal administratively and in state court, Mikel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages and injunctions. The district court dismissed, holding that Tennessee’s sovereign immunity blocked Mikel’s suits against the Department and its director in her official capacity, that Mikel had not properly served process on the director in her individual capacity, and that Mikel failed to state a claim against Omni under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mikel lacked a constitutional liberty interest in her status as a foster parent. View "Mikel v. Quin" on Justia Law

Palma worked for FCA starting in 2013 and allegedly participated in a scheme that manipulated FCA's new diesel engine’s function during testing to produce artificially impressive results with respect to features that FCA was targeting to customers, including fuel economy greater than 30 mpg and a frequency of fluid changes similar to that of gasoline-powered cars. When the vehicles were tested for emissions, the program activated Exhaust Gas Recirculation, sacrificing fuel economy. When the vehicles were tested for fuel economy, Recirculation was lowered, increasing emissions. Palma knew that these results were critical to receiving the “best-in-class” fuel economy ratings and that the vehicles did not meet EPA requirements. A sticker affixed to the cars stated they complied with regulations and provided detailed emissions information, as influenced by Palma's scheme. FCA sold more than 100,000 of these vehicles. Customers who purchased the vehicles said that the misleading representations were material to their purchase decisions.Palma was charged with 13 counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The district court held that there was an insufficient causal nexus between Palma’s conduct and customers being induced to purchase vehicles and that Palma’s conduct was less a deprivation of consumer property and more a deception of regulators. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of that count, reasoning that Palma was only charged with conspiracy, not wire fraud itself, and the indictment alleges adequate facts tying Palma to a fraudulent scheme. View "United States v. Palma" on Justia Law

CoreCivic operates private prisons. Years ago, the company’s stockholders brought a class action alleging securities fraud. The company settled that suit, and the district court entered final judgment. Three months later, Newby claimed that the documents produced in the securities action would help establish CoreCivic’s responsibility for the death of her son in one of its prisons. The district court unsealed most, but not all, of the documents Newby sought. She appealed, but settled with CoreCivic and moved to voluntarily dismiss her appeal.At the same time, Tardy moved to intervene in the appeal, Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Like Newby, Tardy had a son who died in a CoreCivic prison. Tardy waived any claim that the denial of documents in this action hinders his ability to litigate his separate suit against CoreCivic for the death of his son and conceded that he has not suffered any adverse effects from the denial of documents. Instead, he seeks to vindicate the public’s right of access to judicial records. The Sixth Circuit denied his motion for lack of standing. To have standing, litigants must have suffered adverse effects from the denial of information. View "Grae v. Corrections Corp. of America" on Justia Law

In 2006, Watkins confessed to killing Varner. In jail, he refused to eat and urinated on himself. After four pretrial psychological evaluations, Watkins’s problematic behavior continued at trial; the judge removed him to a secured room. Watkins was convicted. In 2008, Watkins filed a pro se habeas petition but did not pay the filing fee or seek to proceed in forma pauperis. His petition was dismissed. In 2010, Watkins filed a “motion for equitable tolling,” alleging sentencing errors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct. The court stayed the federal case, pending exhaustion of his claims in state court.In 2014, after state courts rejected his claims, Watkins filed a “supplemental” federal petition, with additional claims. The district court construed Watkins’s petition as a motion to amend his 2010 petition and awarded habeas relief based on counsel’s failure to request another competency evaluation after his trial outbursts. The court reasoned that the claim related back to Watkins’s 2010 petition under Federal Rule 15 because both petitions raised ineffective-assistance claims and equitably tolled the limitations period due to Watkins’s mental-health struggles. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the ineffective-assistance claim in the amended petition did not “relate back” to the generic 2010 ineffective-assistance claim and that Watkins was not entitled to equitable tolling.On remand, Watkins argued, for the first time, that his amended petition related back to the 2008 petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), an amended petition will “relate[] back to the date” of the original petition if the new claims arose from the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” as the old ones. A subsequent new suit does not “relate back to the date” of the petition in a dismissed suit. View "Watkins v. Stephenson" on Justia Law