Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Until their 2017 terminations, the Plaintiffs were employed by Pontiac Hospital. They filed separate EEOC charges, alleging race, gender, and religious discrimination, and retaliation, under Title VII. After EEOC issued “Right to Sue” letters, neither Plaintiff filed a Title VII suit. They initiated a qui tam action (False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729), alleging that Pontiac rendered unnecessary patient procedures to inflate its Medicare and Medicaid payments. The government obtained extensions for its investigation and, after about 30 months, declined to intervene.The district court unsealed the complaint on October 26, which began the 90-day period for service. The Plaintiffs did not seek the issuance of a summons but filed an amended complaint, then sent the amended complaint, without a summons, via certified mail to the Defendants on January 22, 2021 (within the 90-day period). There was no confirmation that the Defendants received it; the Plaintiffs obtained the issuance of a summons on March 4. Service occurred on March 15. The district court dismissed. The Plaintiffs failed to establish good cause for their delay; the court declined to grant a discretionary extension of time. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court applied a five-factor analysis and reasonably concluded that, although the statute of limitations would bar the Plaintiffs from refiling their claims, the remaining factors weighed in favor of the Defendants. View "United States v. Oakland Physicians Medical Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The 2008 financial crisis caused GM and Chrysler into bankruptcy. In Europe, Fiat faced similar troubles. Fiat CEO Marchionne forged a relationship with the United Auto Workers (UAW). Fiat negotiated a partial purchase of Chrysler. Chrysler and the UAW agreed to Marchionne’s request to jettison certain traditional union protections. The companies emerged from bankruptcy with the UAW large percentages of their equity.GM alleges that Marchionne subsequently implemented a bribery scheme to revive Chrysler and harm GM. Fiat acquired the UAW’s stake in Chrysler. The new entity, “FCA,” allegedly “began a long-running intentional scheme of improper payments" to UAW officials … to influence the collective bargaining process, providing Chrysler with labor peace and competitive advantages. GM rejected Marchionne's proposal for a merger in 2015; although bribed UAW executives pressed GM to agree. During subsequent collective bargaining, the UAW and FCA allegedly conspired “to force enormous costs on GM.”In 2017, the Justice Department criminally charged numerous FCA executives and UAW officials. Several entered guilty pleas. FCA pleaded guilty and agreed to a $30 million fine. The UAW agreed to a consent decree, requiring federal monitoring.GM sued FCA, Fiat, and individuals, asserting RICO claims, 18 U.S.C. 1962(b), (c), and (d). The district court dismissed. Assuming that FCA committed RICO violations, they were either indirect or too remote to have proximately caused GM’s alleged injuries. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction. The court noted the existence of a more “immediate victim,” the FCA workers, “better situated to sue.” GM has not alleged that it would have received the same benefits as FCA absent the corruption. View "General Motors, LLC v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

Ozomaro was indicted for possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. After competency proceedings and the withdrawal of appointed counsel, the court allowed Ozomaro to proceed pro se, with standby counsel. Ozomaro repeatedly asserted that he would not attend his trial and submitted incoherent jurisdictional arguments. On the day set for trial, Ozomaro refused to leave his holding cell. The court adjourned until October 20. On October 20, Ozomaro appeared. The court empaneled 12 jurors and two alternates. After a day of deliberations, a juror informed a court staff member that she observed a juror drinking alcohol during lunch and that “the same individual hates the Government and doesn’t believe anything they say.” Another juror called to ask if “it was legal to drink on lunch break,” stating that “a juror openly admitted bias to the Government.” The court separately questioned each juror. Most of the jurors verified the allegations about Juror 109, who was excused and replaced with an alternate juror. The jury was told, “start completely brand new.” Following a guilty verdict, Ozomaro was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was a sufficient factual inquiry from which to find good cause and conclude that there was no reasonable possibility that the discharge stemmed from Juror 109’s views of the case. The court upheld the application of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on Ozomaro’s refusal to appear. View "United States v. Ozomaro" on Justia Law

Hackers compromised customer-payment information at several Wendy’s franchisee restaurants. Shareholders took legal action against Wendy’s directors and officers on the corporation’s behalf to remedy any wrongdoing that might have allowed the breach to occur. Three shareholder derivative legal efforts ensued—two actions and one pre-suit demand—leading to a series of mediation sessions. Two derivative actions (filed by Graham and Caracci) were consolidated and resulted in a settlement, which the district court approved after appointing one of the settling shareholder’s attorneys as the lead counsel. Those decisions drew unsuccessful objections from Caracci, who had not participated in the latest settlement discussions. No other shareholder objected. Caracci appealed decisions made by the district court, which together had the effect of dramatically reducing Caracci’s entitlement to an attorney’s fees award.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court acted within the bounds of its wide discretion to manage shareholder litigation in its appointment of a lead counsel, its approval of the settlement, and its interlocutory orders on discovery and the mediation privilege. View "Graham v. Peltz" on Justia Law

Fields was charged with possession of 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The indictment alleged that Fields had two prior Kentucky “final conviction[s] for . . . serious drug felon[ies]” for which he served over a year in prison and was released within 15 years of the instant offense: “Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in the First Degree,” and “Unlawful Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor and Persistent Felony Offender,” The trial was bifurcated into two phases to prove the substantive drug offense and to prove that Fields had previously been convicted of two serious drug felonies.The Sixth Circuit vacated Fields’ 25-year mandatory-minimum enhanced sentence, rejecting one of the “serious drug offense” predicates. Kentucky’s meth-precursor statute applies when a defendant was not yet capable of manufacturing methamphetamine and does not “necessarily entail” manufacturing under section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The court rejected challenges to the procedure used to impose the enhancement, including arguments that 21 U.S.C. 851(b), which governs procedures for imposing the enhancement, facially violated the Fifth Amendment by compelling defendants to testify regarding previous convictions and that section 851(c) facially violates the Sixth Amendment by requiring judges to determine facts—the length and recency of incarceration—that the Constitution requires to be decided by a jury. View "United States v. Fields" on Justia Law

In a parking lot, Officer Powers approached Shumate’s daughter (Amy) to question why her license plates did not match her car’s registration. Amy did not have insurance and was not allowed to drive home. After Amy called Shumate for a ride, Powers and Amy began to argue about retrieving items from the car. Shumate arrived and immediately began to argue with Powers; the two had had prior hostile interactions. About 47 seconds after Shumate arrived, Powers fired his Taser. Shumate fell backward, screaming in pain. Powers claims Powers straddled the prone Shumate, yelling “stop resisting,” though the video indicates no resistance. Powers deployed his Taser again. Powers apparently punched and kneed Shumate, again deployed the taser, and employed palm-heel, backhand, and knee strikes. Shumate was treated at a hospital and eventually pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of being a disorderly person. Powers was disciplined for “rudeness to a citizen” (Amy).In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part; neither qualified nor state law immunity shields Powers from liability. The right to be free from being tased and subjected to physical force (alleged punching, knee strikes, kicking, and hitting) while not actively resisting and while being non-violent was clearly established before 2019, Powers was on “notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.” View "Shumate v. City of Adrian" on Justia Law

Corrections officer Johnson found Zakora in his bunk, dead from accidental fentanyl toxicity. Earlier, another prisoner allegedly told Johnson and/or Mobley to check on Zakora. Mobley worked the night shift before Johnson’s shift started. Both officers stated in unrebutted affidavits that they had no knowledge that Zakora possessed, ingested, or intended to ingest illegal drugs. Mobley stated that he did not speak with Zakora during his shift, and no one advised him to check on Zakora; Johnson stated he discovered Zakora only seconds after a prisoner said that Zakora was not “doing too good.” Two other prisoners in the small unit were hospitalized from drug overdoses in the days before Zakora’s death, but no immediate investigation was undertaken. After Zakora’s death, a drug-detection dog gave positive indications of contraband in the unit.Zakora’s overdose, according to his Estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, was the consequence of a longstanding problem of drug smuggling into Lakeland, orchestrated by an unidentified female corrections officer; an unidentified prisoner allegedly informed inspectors about the drug-smuggling ring. The estate claimed failure to protect Zakora, failure to promptly investigate other drug overdoses, and deliberate indifference to Zakora’s serious medical needs. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint, in part, The allegations state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim and a claim for supervisory liability against two defendants. The court did not consider qualified immunity. View "Estate of Zakora v. Chrisman" on Justia Law

Hurst sought a loan modification in 2018. Caliber notified Hurst that her application was complete as of April 5, 2018, that it would evaluate her eligibility within 30 days, that it would not commence foreclosure during that period, and that it might need additional documents for second-stage review. On May 1, Caliber requested additional documents within 30 days. Although Hurst responded, she did not meet all of Caliber’s requirements. On May 31, Caliber informed Hurst that it could not review her application. Hurst sent some outstanding documents on June 7, but her application remained incomplete. Caliber filed a foreclosure action on June 18. Hurst spent $13,922 in litigating the foreclosure but continued working with Caliber. Caliber again denied the application as incomplete on August 31 but eventually approved her loan modification and dismissed the foreclosure action.Hurst filed suit under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that Caliber violated Regulation X’s prohibition on “dual tracking,” which prevents a servicer from initiating foreclosure while a facially complete loan-modification application is pending, 12 C.F.R. 1024.41(f)(2); failed to exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining documents and information necessary to complete her application, section 1024.41(b)(1); and failed to provide adequate notice of the information needed to complete its review (1024.41(b)(2)). The district court granted Caliber summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the “reasonable diligence” claim. Hurst identified communications where Caliber employees provided conflicting information and had trouble identifying deficiencies. View "Hurst v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, two jail officers, and dismissing Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that Defendants caused his injuries, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that either defendant violated his constitutional rights.Plaintiff was booked into Boone County Detention Center on nonviolent drug charges and was placed in a cell with Jordan Webster, a fellow detainee. Webster attacked and beat Plaintiff during the night. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him from the risk of harm posed by Webster. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm by failing to protect him from Webster. View "Stein v. Gunkel" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the district court entering default judgment against Defendants in this breach of contract and fraud action and awarding damages to Plaintiffs on all counts, holding that there was error in the damages award.During the underlying litigation, Defendants committed a string of "egregious" discovery violations, and the district court entered default judgment as a sanction. After a hearing, the district court awarded Plaintiffs two types of breach-of-contract-related damages. The Court then awarded fraud and punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs' fraud claim failed because it did not plead fraud with particularity as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); (2) Kentucky's choice-of-remedies rule and the economic-loss doctrine barred Plaintiffs from recovering for both breach of contract and fraud; and (3) because Plaintiffs could not recover fraud damages, the punitive damages award could not stand. View "New London Tobacco Market, Inc. v. Ky. Fuel Corp." on Justia Law