Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Owens was convicted of five counts of possessing or aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)), one carjacking, four counts of bank robbery by force or violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. A single section 924(c) conviction carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Each subsequent 924(c) conviction then (2004) triggered an additional 25 years, even if those convictions were part of a single indictment. If Owens had agreed to cooperate, the government would have allowed him to plead guilty to a single count. After Owens rejected the government’s offers, he was convicted and sentenced to 1260 months.Owens’s co-conspirators pleaded guilty and were sentenced, respectively, to 21 months, 33 months, 39 years, and 25 years of incarceration. In 2019, Owens sought resentencing, noting that he would not be subject to the same lengthy sentence if sentenced today because the First Step Act amended 18 U.S.C. 924(c), so that his sentence would be 25 years. Appointed counsel argued that Owens was punished for going to trial and emphasized his “remarkable” record of rehabilitation. Owens then moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1).The district court denied Owens’s motion, concluding that the disparity between Owens's sentence and the sentence that he would receive today was not an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release. The court did not consider any other factors. The Sixth Circuit reversed, directing the court to consider whether Owens’s rehabilitative efforts and the lengthy sentence he received because of exercising his right to a trial may, in combination with the First Step Act’s changes, constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. View "United States v. Owens" on Justia Law

Frei, age 48, used Facebook to contact teenage girls until the Metro Nashville Police Department became aware of his activities. Convicted of eight counts of child-exploitation-related crimes, including four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. 2251, Frei was sentenced to 318 months' imprisonment and lifetime supervised release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a jury instruction regarding 18 U.S.C. 2251 and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Pattern Jury Instruction 16.01 explains that the jury must find: That the defendant employed, used, persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced] a minor, to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct; 16.01(2)(C) defines the phrase “for the purpose of” as meaning that the defendant acted with the intent to create visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct, and that the defendant knew the character and content of the visual depictions. Frei proposed adding: The defendant must have engaged in sexually explicit conduct with the specific intent to produce a visual depiction. It is not enough for the government to simply prove that the defendant purposely produced the visual depiction. The Pattern Jury Instruction allowed Frei to argue that he did not have sex with his victim for the sole purpose of creating the visual depictions. Section 2251(a) does not have a sole-purpose provision. View "United States v. Frei" on Justia Law

The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s “three-strikes rule,” 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), provides that a prisoner accrues a strike when he brings a frivolous lawsuit. After three strikes, the Act prohibits inmates from filing those lawsuits without paying the initial court fee. Simons, a Michigan prisoner, broke a prison window. Prison officials removed money from his commissary account to make repairs. Simons filed a pro se complaint, targeting this seizure of funds as a violation of state and federal law. The district court allowed Simons to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1), then screened Simons’s lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and rejected Simons’s federal claims on the merits. The court stated the dismissal would count as a “strike.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Simon’s challenges to the underlying dismissal lacked merit. The court’s “opinion” calling the dismissal a strike is not a judgment, and will not, alone, prohibit Simons from filing a free lawsuit in the future. Section 1915(g) calls on a later court that has before it a civil action brought by the prisoner to engage in a backward-looking inquiry and determine whether the prisoner “on 3 or more prior occasions” has brought an action or appeal that was “dismissed on the grounds that [it was] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.” View "Simons v. Washington" on Justia Law

The government uncovered substantial evidence that Sheckles was a Louisville distributor for a large drug trafficking ring. Sheckles pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s refusal to suppress much of this evidence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting arguments that officers did not have “probable cause” for the warrants to track his phone and search his apartments, engaged in an “unreasonable” “seizure” when they stopped his car and detained him, and engaged in an “unreasonable” “search” when they looked through his storage unit. Information in the officers’ affidavit provided a “substantial basis” for the state judge’s finding that probable cause existed to obtain the phone’s location data. The totality of the circumstances permitted the state judge to find probable cause to search this apartment. Officers at least had a “reasonable suspicion” to initiate the stop, after seeing Sheckles leaving an apartment they were about to search, and the handgun they later discovered gave them probable cause to arrest Sheckles at that point. Handcuffing “does not affect the legitimacy of the Terry stop” as long as the facts justify the precaution. The court concluded that a third party had actual authority to consent to the search of the storage unit. View "United States v. Sheckles" on Justia Law

In 2016, Harvey pleaded guilty to distributing a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 156 months’ imprisonment. Harvey filed an unsuccessful section 2255 motion for habeas corpus relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. On June 12, 2020, Harvey sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that “[t]he ongoing coronavirus pandemic presents extraordinary and compelling reasons where a defendant is susceptible to infection,” he cited his “chronic bronchitis” and the spread of COVID-19 cases at the facility in which he was incarcerated.The district court denied Harvey’s motion without holding a hearing. The one-page form stated that the court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statement. A checked box stated: “DENIED after complete review of the motion on the merits.” Weeks later, the court filed a five-page “OPINION." The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The form order was not necessarily procedurally defective; the facts in the record provide a reasonable basis for the denial of Harvey’s motion. Harvey admitted “that he had been selling drugs for over a year”; the prosecutor asserted at sentencing that Harvey’s house contained “a gun” and “ammunition”; Harvey had earlier drug-related convictions and had served only about 25% of his custodial sentence. The record can be read to support the conclusion that section 3553(a) did not favor Harvey’s release. View "United States v. Harvey" on Justia Law

In May 2017, Jackson was convicted of three counts of carjacking and three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). While Jackson’s appeal was pending, Congress enacted the First Step Act. Three months later, the Sixth Circuit vacated one of his section 924(c) convictions and remanded for resentencing. The district court determined that the First Step Act’s amendments to section 924(c) apply retroactively to someone who, like Jackson, had his sentence vacated after the Act became law and sentenced him accordingly, reducing the 32-year mandatory minimum sentences he faced under section 924(c) to 14 years. Because Jackson no longer faced 57 years of mandatory minimum sentences, the district court increased his sentence for the three carjackings from 87 months’ imprisonment to 108 months.The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court should not have applied the amended section 924(c), which applies for a defendant on whom “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of” December 21, 2018. As of that day, a sentence had been imposed on Jackson. That the first sentence was later vacated does not alter Jackson’s status on the day the First Step Act became law. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Jackson and Combs pleaded guilty to participating in a cocaine distribution ring. Jackson was sentenced to 192 months’ imprisonment due to his role as a leader in the drug-distribution conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a).. Combs was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment due to his career-offender status, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to Jackson, who recruited and supervised participants and held a substantial amount of the cash proceeds. The court also rejected Jackson's challenge to the mandatory-minimum 20-year sentence he received in accordance with 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), due to his prior marijuana-trafficking conviction.The court initially held that Combs’s Kentucky trafficking offense categorically qualified as a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines; U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 and Combs’s designation as a career offender. The court rejected Combs’s argument that distribution requires a commercial aspect. In an amended opinion, the Sixth Circuit cited intervening circuit precedent and reversed the career-offender finding for Combs. Conspiracy to distribute controlled substances is not a controlled substances offense under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b). View "United States v. Combs" on Justia Law

Stampe and Loden were charged with conspiring to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine. Stampe pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government in its case against Loden. Before Stampe’s sentencing, the government dropped Loden’s case after “discover[ing] circumstances apart from evidence of . . . guilt which prevent[ed] . . . moving forward.” The government told Stampe that Loden’s dismissal did not affect its case against her; the dismissal related to inappropriate conduct by a confidential informant. Stampe moved to compel the government to disclose the information that led to the dismissal of Loden’s conspiracy charge or to review that evidence in camera and moved to withdraw from her plea agreement.Relying on government representations both that the informant’s misconduct happened after Stampe’s arrest and that the government had complied with disclosure obligations, the district court denied Stampe’s motions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Even assuming Stampe said enough to trigger Rule 16 or Brady disclosure in the abstract, her arguments fail because of the court’s reliance on the government’s representations that items sought were immaterial. While Stampe believed that she might avoid some prison time because of her putative cooperation in Loden’s case, the plea agreement did not require that possibility; it was not the “principal purpose” of the agreement. View "United States v. Stampe" on Justia Law

Nian worked as a home healthcare mentor for a family with a special-needs child, “SG.” After one visit, SG’s sister, JCG, claimed that Nian entered her room, tried to kiss her, put his hands on her private areas, and then pulled down her leggings and tried to perform oral sex on her. Her mother called the police and took JCG to the hospital. Nian was found guilty of rape by cunnilingus. Nian later sought a new trial, based on an affidavit from a juror, Cox, stating that another juror had introduced into deliberations facts about Nian being from Sierra Leone and having a prior criminal record, which she felt influenced the verdict. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court excluded Cox’s testimony under Ohio Rule of Evidence 606(B) (aliunde rule) and denied Nian’s request for a new trial. The court stated that it questioned the credibility of the proffered testimony. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of Nian’s petition for habeas relief. it is a constitutional error for a state court to use Ohio’s aliunde rule to exclude evidence of a jury’s consideration of extraneous information. This is not the rare case where the introduction of extraneous information was harmless. View "Nian v. Warden, North Central Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

When the state called Blackwell to testify at Miller's trial for the 1995 murder of Rice, she claimed that she could not remember anything about the day in question. Out of the jury’s presence, the judge sent Blackwell to jail to read statements that she had given to police shortly after the murder and notes that Miller’s investigator took when speaking with her. Blackwell returned to court and testified, consistently with her police statement, that the morning after the murder, she saw Miller in a car that looked like Rice’s and that Miller told her that Rice was dead before anyone else could have known. During cross-examination, Miller’s attorney asked Blackwell how she had regained her memory. Blackwell replied: “I don’t want to go to jail.”The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ordered a new trial. Blackwell was unavailable. Rather than allow all of Blackwell’s testimony to be read to the jury, the court carved “any reference of incarceration or intimidation.” The jury never heard Blackwell’s statement that she did not want to go to jail. The rest of the prosecution’s case relied heavily on the testimony of a single eyewitness, who had credibility problems. Convicted, Miller received a life sentence. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Miller’s claim that the court erred in admitting Blackwell’s redacted testimony.The Sixth Circuit reversed a denial of habeas corpus relief. Confrontation of an adverse witness necessarily entails that the trier of fact be allowed to learn the material results of that confrontation. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals' application of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was objectively unreasonable. View "Miller v. Genovese" on Justia Law