Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Zheng, a citizen of China, entered the U.S. without inspection by crossing the Mexican border in 2014, with her 22-year-old son. Following a credible fear interview, in which Zheng claimed that she was arrested by the police in China and threatened with harm unless she stopped practicing Christianity, DHS initiated removal proceedings, charging Zheng under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). She sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that she had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her religion. In a 28-page opinion, the IJ summarized the hearing testimony, determined that Zheng lacked credibility, and held that the evidence Zheng presented (three letters purportedly from Zheng’s sisters) was insufficient corroborative evidence to support her claims. The IJ ordered Zheng removed to China. The BIA concluded that she did not meet her burden of proving eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the IJ’s determination supported by substantial evidence and rejecting claims of various due process violations. View "Zheng v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Sakhawati, a citizen of Bangladesh, was apparently admitted to the U.S. in 1998, using a passport issued to “Muhibun Nessa.” She travelled to Canada and was denied refugee status there in 2003. She was granted asylum and withholding of removal in the U.S. under the name Sakhawati in 2006 after testifying to being kidnapped, forced to marry, and targeted for promoting feminist political views inside Bangladesh. In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security appealed and moved to reopen the proceedings, based on new information showing that Sakhawati’s story was fraudulent and that Sakhawati had actually been residing in Canada during the time that she was allegedly being forced to marry and held captive in Bangladesh. The BIA granted the motion. On remand, the IJ reversed his original ruling, denied Sakhawati’s claims for relief, and ordered her removed to Bangladesh. Sakhawati appealed, arguing that the documents proffered by DHS were previously available and could have been discovered and presented at her prior hearing. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded; a DHS official exercising due diligence could have readily discovered the existence of the Nessa alien file and presented it at Sakhawati’s original hearing. View "Sakhawati v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Odeh was charged under 18 U.S.C. 1425(a), which provides that “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” shall be fined or imprisoned. On her 1994 immigrant visa application and her 2004 naturalization application, Odeh stated that she had continuously lived in Amman since 1948 and answered “No” in response to questions of whether she had “ever been arrested, convicted, or ever been in a prison,” been convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude,” or been “convicted of 2 or more offenses for which the aggregate sentences were 5 years or more.” Odeh lived in Israel and Lebanon before moving to Jordan in 1983. In 1969-1970, Odeh was convicted for her role in a bombing in a supermarket that killed two civilians and wounded others, and for her role in an attempted bombing of the British Consulate. One conviction related to her membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which was designated a “foreign terrorist organization” by the Secretary of State in 1997. After her conviction, the court revoked Odeh’s citizenship and sentenced her to 18 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on the exclusion of Odeh’s witness, an expert in post-traumatic stress disorder, from testifying about why Odeh did not know that her statements were false due to alleged torture in an Israeli prison. Such testimony is not categorically inadmissible to negate a defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of a statement. View "United Syayes v. Rasmieh Odeh" on Justia Law

Hih, a Palestinian, overstayed a nonimmigrant visa and was subjected to removal proceedings. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, testifying that he had worked as an anti-terrorist agent with the Palestinian Authority, which subjected him to threats of persecution from Hamas. The IJ found Hih not to be credible and denied relief, but granted Hih’s request for voluntary departure. The BIA affirmed in January 2013, but found the IJ’s advisals regarding voluntary departure deficient. Instead of reversing the grant of voluntary departure, the BIA dismissed Hih’s appeal of the removal order and remanded “to allow the [IJ] the opportunity to provide [Hih] with the proper voluntary departure advisals.” At a March 13, 2013 hearing, Hih unsuccessfully attempted to supplement the record, then withdrew his request for voluntary departure. The IJ ordered Hih removed. Hih appealed. On April 3, 2015 the BIA treated Hih’s appeal as a motion to reconsider its earlier order and denied it as outside of the 30-day window. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, noting that Hih’s arguments concerned only the January 2013 BIA decision, which was “final,” and that Hih was required to file his appeal within 30 days of the BIA’s final order. View "Hih v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Esquivel-Quintana was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor in California. Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which states that an alien can be removed if he is convicted of an aggravated felony such as “sexual abuse of a minor,” An immigration judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction under California Penal Code section 261.5(c) constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” and ordered him removed to Mexico. The BIA and Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” was permissibly interpreted to include the conviction. The BIA employed a categorical approach and held that the age differential in California’s statute—which requires an age gap of more than three years— was meaningful. View "Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Nancy and Saed Marouf, and their daughter were stateless Christian Palestinians, living in the West Bank. Saed arrived in the U.S. in 2008. Nancy and Naheda arrived in 2009. The Maroufs now have two children who were born in the U.S. Nancy sought asylum and withholding of removal, naming Saed and Naheda as derivative beneficiaries. Saed and Naheda applied separately. The Maroufs were placed in removal proceedings and charged with being unlawfully present in the U.S. They claimed that they were persecuted as a result of their Christian religion and testified about numerous instances, including Saed being attacked after he had escorted a group of Christian women who were being harassed by Muslim men; an attempted rape of Nancy; and a fire-bombing of Nancy’s parents’ house. The IJ denied relief, concluding that their testimony was not credible and failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution (asylum) or that it was more likely than not that they would be harmed (withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture) if removed. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence and noting that discretionary denials of asylum to otherwise-eligible applicants are rare and appropriate only in narrow circumstances. View "Marouf v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2003, Sanchez-Robles, a citizen of Mexico, and her four children, all born in Mexico, illegally entered the U.S.. Her husband, who does not have legal status in the U.S., has traveled back and forth between Mexico and the U.S. multiple times. In 2010, Sanchez-Robles was convicted of theft of property under $500 and was sentenced to three days in jail. Her counsel conceded her removability based on the conviction. Sanchez-Robles applied for withholding of removal, arguing that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her status as a “Mexican returnee” who spent significant time in, and has familial ties to the U.S. Sanchez-Robles testified that in 2002 she received phone calls claiming that her husband had been kidnapped and that her mother received calls from individuals claiming to have kidnapped Sanchez-Robles and her sibling. Neither Sanchez-Robles nor her mother paid; no one was harmed. Sanchez-Robles also presented evidence that her hometown has a problem with organized crime. The Immigration Judge determined that Sanchez-Robles was not eligible for withholding of removal and had not established a “clear probability” of persecution based on membership in a protected group. The BIA and Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no particular social group consisting of nationals who return to their home country with the perception that they are wealthy. View "Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Cruz-Gomez was admitted to the United States in 2006 on a temporary work visa. He remained in the U.S. after his visa expired, and DHS initiated removal proceedings. Cruz-Gomez appeared with counsel, conceded that he was removable as charged, and claimed that he would seek asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ notified Cruz-Gomez and his counsel that he would schedule two further hearings—a master calendar hearing on March 12, 2013, and an individual hearing on August 8, 2013. Neither Cruz-Gomez nor his counsel appeared at the March 12 hearing. The hearing was conducted in absentia and Cruz-Gomez was ordered to be removed to Mexico. On July 16, Cruz-Gomez, represented by new counsel, moved to reopen his proceedings, arguing that he received notice only of the August 8 hearing. On August 22, the IJ denied the motion, finding that Cruz-Gomez’s claim that he did not know about the March 12 hearing was “not correct” because Cruz-Gomez was “specifically told” about both hearing dates through a Spanish interpreter; that Cruz-Gomez’s counsel was provided with written notices of the two hearings. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Cruz-Gomez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Yousif, a citizen of Iraq and a Chaldean Christian, entered the U.S. and applied for asylum and withholding of removal in 2007. The immigration judge adjudicated the claims four years later. By that time, the attorney general conceded that conditions in Iraq for Chaldean Christians were so turbulent that there was a clear probability that Yousif would be persecuted based on his religion if he was returned to Iraq. The IJ agreed and granted Yousif withholding of removal. However, the IJ denied Yousif asylum, ruling that Yousif had filed a “frivolous” asylum application, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6), by deliberately fabricating one of its “material elements,” by falsely claiming that he had experienced past incidents of persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit vacated, observing that generally the burden of proof is more onerous in obtaining withholding of removal than asylum. The IJ did not determine whether, at the time that Yousif submitted his application, contemporary conditions in Iraq were so dangerous for Chaldean Christians that Yousif would have been eligible for asylum based solely upon his religion, and, therefore, failed to determine whether Yousif’s misrepresentations were material to his application when they were made. View "Yousif v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, arrived illegally in the U.S. in 1988. He has four times been convicted of driving under the influence, most recently in 2010. In 1995, he pled guilty to property theft. The maximum punishment was one year in prison, but the Arkansas court imposed a suspended sentence of 30 days. He remained eligible, under then-existing immigration laws, to petition for suspension of deportation. The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, combined to make ineligible for cancellation of removal any alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude punishable by a year or more in prison, regardless of the punishment actually imposed. In 2010, Ice agents detained petitioner. He sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his mother—a legal permanent resident—and his daughter—a U.S. citizen. The IJ expressly rejected petitioner’s argument that his eligibility for cancellation of removal should be determined by the law that was in effect at the time petitioner received his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C) prohibits cancellation of removal for aliens convicted of “offenses under” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2); petitioner was convicted of such an offense . View "Velasco-Tijero v. Lynch" on Justia Law