Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Michigan office of Alix, an international company, administers payroll and benefits for U.S. employees and is directly involved in U.S. hiring. In 2013, Alix hired Brewington, a Texas resident, for its Dallas Corporate Services team. The employment agreement provides that it “will be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Michigan” and states, “any dispute arising out of or in connection with any aspect of this Agreement and/or any termination of employment . . ., shall be exclusively subject to binding arbitration under the . . . American Arbitration Association . . . decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding as to both parties.” In 2014, Brewington was terminated. He filed a demand for arbitration, asserting claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, on behalf of himself and a purported nationwide class of current, former, and potential Alix employees. The Michigan district court ruled that Brewington was precluded from pursuing arbitration claims on behalf of any purported class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that court’s refusal to dismiss, finding that Brewington had sufficient contacts with Michigan to establish personal jurisdiction, and upheld summary judgment in favor of Alix. An agreement must expressly include the possibility of classwide arbitration to indicate that the parties agreed to it. This clause is silent on the issue and is limited to claims concerning “this Agreement,” as opposed to other agreements. It refers to “both parties.” View "AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington" on Justia Law

Richardson, then age 50, began working at Wal-Mart in 2000. Richardson’s evaluations were generally positive. Wal-Mart’s first three levels of employee discipline are “written coachings,” the fourth is termination. The second and third levels require a plan of action and electronic acknowledgement of the coaching. Richardson’s first coaching, in 2011, involved her attempt to influence the exchange of her daughter’s computer. Her second coaching involved failure to package properly a hazardous-material item. Richardson drafted an action plan. Richardson's third coaching, in August 2012, involved violating Wal-Mart’s attendance policy, with four unscheduled absences in six months. Richardson drafted another action plan. Richardson claimed a medical excuse, but did not provide documentation. Richardson claims that in late 2012, she perceived that she was mistreated by management, based on her age. In March 2013, Richardson was stacking merchandise when she fell and broke her wrist. Store manager Darby reviewed a surveillance video and concluded that Richardson had created a safety hazard through her placement of equipment. Other managers reached a similar conclusion. Darby concluded that the coaching for unsafe work practices would result in termination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, rejecting claims of age discrimination under Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Richardson lacked direct evidence that her termination was based on her age and failed to establish that Wal-Mart’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge was pretextual. View "Richardson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

On May 6, 2016, the NLRB (Board) found that the Union had violated the National Labor Relations Act by seeking to undermine prior NLRB judgments. The Union petitioned for review on June 13. The Board cross-petitioned on July 6. On July 13, five of the six charging parties, all winners in the Board proceedings, moved to intervene in both the Union’s petition and the Board’s cross-petition after the court clerk’s office directed them to do so. On August 2, more than 30 days after the Union filed its initial petition for review, the charging parties’ counsel filed another amended motion to intervene, clarifying that they had inadvertently omitted a sixth charging party, Hunt Construction, from their first two motions. No one objected to Hunt’s motion. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(d), which sets forth the conditions for intervening and includes a 30-day filing deadline, does not implement any general jurisdictional statute and is claim-processing-rule that permits forfeiture and equitable exceptions to the deadline. View "Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Stevens worked for Baker from 1989 until 1996. When his employment ended, Stevens signed a contract in which he promised to maintain the confidentiality of Baker’s trade secrets. In 1999, Stevens sued, alleging failure to fully pay the compensation due him during his employment. The parties eventually settled; Baker paid Stevens $10,000. Around that time, Stevens formed S&S Chemical to produce polyethylene products. Baker suspected that S&S was improperly using Baker’s EP Processes and sent Stevens a letter in 2002 reminding Stevens of his Termination Agreement. Stevens responded that he had independently developed the processes used to manufacture S&S’s chemicals. Baker later confirmed that S&S was not then using Baker’s confidential information. Baker again became suspicious and, in 2014, sued Stevens. The Sixth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Stevens. Petrolite unquestionably knew of and approved each step that gave rise to the settlement contract at issue, the Release Provision of which unambiguously released Stevens from the obligations of the Termination Agreement. View "Baker Hughes Inc. v. S&S Chemical, LLC" on Justia Law

Samaan, a General Dynamics engineer since 1977, believed that the company was using the wrong shock-and-vibration testing methods on Stryker armored vehicles developed for use by the Army in Afghanistan and Iraq, which led, in turn, to submission of purportedly erroneous reports detailing the shock-and-vibration specifications for the vehicles. Samaan alleged that from 2004-2010 he repeatedly raised his concerns and eventually “filed a formal claim of data misrepresentation, fraud, and retaliation” with the Human Resources Department in 2010. General Dynamics allegedly gave Samaan his first poor performance evaluation in 2011, with a statement that his evaluation “would improve if he would ‘forget’ about the testing misrepresentation and fraud.” Samaan eventually took his concerns to the Army. He was suspended without pay, then filed suit, alleging retaliation, and resigned. An arbitrator, required by Samaan’s employment agreement, issued an award in favor of the Company, which the district court declined to vacate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the procedures employed during arbitration and stating that the Federal Arbitration Act does not allow for vacatur based on the fulfillment of moral and ethical obligations. View "Samaan v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Black drove a truck for Western, one of 48 freight service providers that carry raw paper to Dixie’s Bowling Green factory. Black parked the truck, containing 41,214 pounds of pulpboard rolls, separated by 10-lb. rubber mats. Black received permission from Chinn, the Dixie forklift operator, to enter the loading dock. It was “[c]ommon practice” for the truck driver to unload the rubber mats so that the Dixie forklift operator did not “have to get off each time.” Chinn and Black got “into a rhythm” in unloading the materials until Chinn ran over Black’s foot with the forklift, leading to a below-the-knee amputation of Black’s leg. Black received workers’ compensation from Western, then filed a tort action against Dixie, seeking $1,850,000. Following a remand, the district court denied Dixie summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act barred Black’s claims, Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(2), .690. The work Black was doing as part and parcel of what Dixie does; a worker injured in this setting will receive compensation regardless of fault by a company in Dixie’s shoes or one in Western’s shoes. The immunity from a further lawsuit applies as well. This burden and benefit are the trade-offs built into any workers’ compensation system. View "Black v. Dixie Consumer Prods., LLC" on Justia Law

Kellogg and the Union have a Master Agreement, effective 2012-2015, and the supplemental Memphis Agreement, effective 2010-2013. The Master Agreement grants regular employees various benefits without defining regular employees. The Memphis Agreement distinguishes between regular and casual employees. Negotiations for a new Memphis Agreement stalled over Kellogg’s proposals that the casual program no longer simply provide relief to regular employees, but “include any employees hired by Kellogg to perform production or any other bargaining unit work covered by” the Memphis Agreement; casual employees would no longer “be limited in the scope of their work, duties, tasks, hours, or in any other terms or conditions of employment,” could “be employed on an indefinite basis,” and would have seniority rights, access to a grievance procedure, participation in the job bidding process, and priority if Kellogg established an alternative crewing schedule. Insisting that Kellogg was attempting to amend the Master Agreement, the Union concluded negotiations. Kellogg sent a “Last/Best Offer.” The Union did not respond, Kellogg locked out 200 bargaining-unit employees. An ALJ concluded that Kellogg’s proposals were not mid-term modifications of the Master Agreement, so Kellogg was entitled to impose a lockout. The National Labor Relations Board disagreed, finding that Kellogg’s proposal effectively modified the terms of the unexpired Master Agreement. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that the proposal did not modify the Master Agreement's express terms and that the “effective modification” theory has been disclaimed. View "Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Employees at Caterpillar’s Clayton, Ohio facility voted on whether they would be represented as a union by the UAW; 188 employees voted for representation and 229 voted against. The UAW filed objections to instances of interrogation, the creation of the impression of improper surveillance, and the improper announcements of an employee bonus and new smoking shelters shortly before the vote. While the objections were pending, Caterpillar held an employee meeting to announce the construction of a guard shack, during which Craft asked what the shack was for. General Manager Purcell responded that the shack was “for guards,” eliciting laughter. Craft, upset, allegedly told coworkers: You guys (union supporters) just gained another supporter, I’m sick of the way they treat us ... He (Purcell) thinks he can treat us like he treated the thugs he managed … I’m sick of it, that motherfucker is going down now, the gloves are fucking off now.” After the statements were reported to management, Purcell notified the police and terminated Craft’s employment. An ALJ found the interrogations, the bonus, the smoking shelters, and Craft’s termination to be violations of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered remedial measures and a new election held. The NLRB affirmed, also finding a violation by creating the impression of surveillance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and ordered enforcement. View "Caterpillar Logistics, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

From 2009-2013​, Schleicher worked for Preferred, a Michigan-based company that provides staffing for corporate clients. With his female co-workerPiotrowski, Schleicher led Preferred’s healthcare information technology group. The two performed the same job, had the same responsibilities, and each earned a share of the profits they collectively generated. They requested to be paid pursuant to different compensation models: Schleicher received 20% of the group’s profit pool, while Piotrowski received a $100,000 base salary plus a 10% draw from the profit pool. Schleicher outearned Piotrowski by $694,159.38, but had disagreements with Seipenko and other Preferred employees. In 2013, the company modified Schleicher’s compensation model so that it matched Piotrowski’s. At the end of 2013, Seipenko terminated Schleicher. Schleicher sued under the Equal Pay Act, alleging that Preferred violated the statute by paying him more than Piotrowski for three years, then lowering his compensation so that it matched Piotrowski’s. The district court granted summary judgment to Preferred, finding that it had conclusively established that sex played no part in the pay differential between Schleicher and Piotrowski. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Preferred carried its “heavy burden” of proving that the disparity between Piotrowski’s and Schleicher’s pay was due to a “factor other than sex.” View "Schleicher v. Preferred Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Rembisz, an IRS investigator, did not obtain sought-after promotions. He filed an administrative charge of discrimination, claiming ongoing discrimination against his sex (male) and race (Caucasian) or color (white). The Treasury Department investigated and rejected the claim. Federal employees must file a civil action for discrimination “[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of final action,” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c). He filed suit on June 21, 2013, alleging that he received notice of the final agency decision on March 25, within the 90-day window. The Sixth Circuit rejected a motion to dismiss in 2014, stating that Rembisz would have to “come forward with evidence” to support his allegation concerning notice. On remand, he never did so. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. It is presumed that notice is given, “and hence the ninety-day limitations term begins running, on the fifth day following the [] mailing of [a right-to-sue] notification to the claimant[].” The agency served its notification by first class and certified mail on March 15, making March 20 the presumptive date that the limitations period began. Rembisz offered no evidence to the contrary. The government submitted a certified-mail receipt, showing that Rembisz received the notice on March 22, so that his complaint was one day late. View "Rembisz v. Lew" on Justia Law