Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000 and 2002 the FDA issued warnings to Caraco, a Michigan pharmaceutical manufacturer, stating that failure to correct violations promptly could result in enforcement action without further notice. After follow-ups in 2005, the FDA sought a definitive timeline for corrective actions. The FDA issued notices of objectionable conditions in 2006, 2007, and 2008. A consultant audited Caraco’s facilities and stated that it was “likely that FDA will initiate some form of seizure action.” Caraco executives thought the consultant “alarmist.” Later, the FDA issued a formal warning, determining that Caraco products were adulterated and that its manufacturing, processing, and holding policies did not conform to regulations and noting its poor compliance history. The letter stated that failure to promptly correct the violations could result in legal action without further notice, including seizure. A new consultant warned of likely enforcement action. Caraco followed some of its suggestions. In 2009, Caraco issued a nationwide drug recall, constituting “a situation in which there is a reasonable probability that the use of, or exposure to, a violative product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.” The FDA filed a complaint, served Caraco, and seized products. Days later, Caraco began a mass layoff, indicating that it did not “reasonably foresee" the FDA action. A certified class of former Caraco employees alleged that Caraco violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. 2101, by failing to provide 60 days notice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the FDA action was not an unforeseeable business circumstance that would excuse WARN Act compliance. View "Calloway v. Caraco Pharma. Lab., Ltd." on Justia Law

Sergeant Boulton, working in the county jail, was a union leader. The union initiated mandatory contract arbitration with the Sheriff’s Office, at which Undersheriff Swanson testified regarding Taser, firearm, and CPR training. Boulton testified that Swanson had misrepresented the degree of training. The next day, Boulton was instructed to wear his uniform or business attire to subsequent arbitrations. When he later wore a blazer and golf shirt, he was investigated for failing to follow a direct order. Soon after, there was a short power outage at the jail. Boulton was told that there would be an investigation of his actions during the outage. Boulton was notified that subordinates had brought complaints against him and that the department was starting a new investigation. Boulton was “forbidden to inquire with any witnesses or investigators.” Boulton admits that he asked his subordinates for details about the investigation. Boulton was suspended without pay for several days and demoted for creating a “hostile” and “unprofessional” environment for subordinates and for making derogatory comments to female detainees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county. Boulton’s speech at the arbitration was protected by the First Amendment, but he did not show that the demotion and suspension resulted from a policy against criticism, rather than his other “extensive misconduct.” View "Boulton v. Swanson" on Justia Law

When the plant closed, plaintiffs retired under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that provided that the employer would continue health insurance and that coverage an employee had at the time of retirement or termination at age 65 or older (other than discharge for cause) “shall be continued thereafter provided that suitable arrangements for such continuation[] can be made… In the event… benefits … [are] not practicable … the Company in agreement with the Union will provide new benefits and/or coverages as closely related as possible and of equivalent value." In 2011 TRW (employer’s successor) stated that it would discontinue group health care coverage beginning in 2012, but would be providing “Health Reimbursement Accounts” (HRAs) and would make a one-time contribution of $15,000 for each eligible retiree and eligible spouse in 2012 and, in 2013, would provide a $4,800 credit to the HRAs for each eligible party. TRW did not commit to funding beyond 2013. Plaintiffs sued, claiming that the change violated the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The court entered summary judgment, ruling that the CBAs established a commitment to lifetime health care benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but subsequently vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in M & G Polymers. View "United Steel v. Kelsey-Hayes Co." on Justia Law

Yazdian is a first-generation Iranian American and nonpracticing Muslim, who worked as a territory manager for ConMed for five years. During his tenure at ConMed, Yazdian received awards, promotions, and praise, but had interpersonal problems with his manager, Sweatt. In 2010, Yazdian complained that Sweatt was creating a hostile work environment and discriminating against him; within six weeks, ConMed terminated Yazdian. Yazdian filed suit, alleging that ConMed terminated him in retaliation for opposing an unlawful employment practice and because of his national origin and religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted summary judgment for ConMed. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the retaliation claim. Yazdian produced enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he made multiple complaints about a hostile work environment before he knew that his job was in jeopardy. If ConMed wants to argue that Yazdian wrongfully complained about discrimination to save his job, it may make that argument to the jury. The court affirmed as to the discrimination claim, stating that no reasonable jury could find that ConMed terminated Yazdian because of his national origin or religion. View "Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

Wal-Mart is the country’s largest private employer, operating approximately 3,400 stores and employing more than one million people. In 2001, named plaintiffs filed a putative class action (Dukes) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, on behalf of all former and current female Wal-Mart employees. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed certification of the nationwide class of current Wal-Mart employees under Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate questions of law or fact common to the class. The district court then held that all class members who possessed right-to-sue letters from the EEOC could file suit on or before October 28, 2011. Six unnamed Dukes class members filed suit, alleging individual and putative class claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of current and former female employees in Wal-Mart Region 43. . The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The timely filing of a class-action complaint commences suit and tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the putative class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action; the suit is not barred by the earlier litigation. View "Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Howes, the owner of a pickling cucumber farm, was found to be in violation of provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determinations that: Howes’ cucumber harvesters were employees, and not independent contractors, such that the FLSA protections apply; Howes controlled the facilities used to house the migrant farm workers in 2011, and was liable for violations of the MSPA in regard to the provision of substandard housing; and Howes unlawfully interfered with the Department of Labor investigation. View "Perez v. D. Howes, LLC" on Justia Law

The Band, a federally recognized Indian tribe, has more than 4,000 enrolled members, most living within or near its aboriginal lands in Michigan. Under the Little Bands Act and the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 476, the Band enacted a constitution that vests its legislative powers in the Tribal Council and grants the Council power to operate gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2701. The Band entered into a compact with the State of Michigan to conduct gaming activities on Manistee trust lands. The casino has 905 employees: 107 are enrolled Band members, 27 are members of other tribes, and 771 are not members of any Indian tribe. Most casino employees live outside the Band’s trust lands. Apart from the casino, 245 employees work for the Band: 108 are Band members. The Council enacted a Fair Employment Practices Code, which essentially prohibit or drastically restrict most concerted activities, collective bargaining, and organization efforts. Acting under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151–169, the National Labor Relations Board issued an order to the Band to cease and desist enforcing provisions that conflict with the NLRA. The Sixth Circuit entered an enforcement order, finding that the NLRA applies to the casino. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians" on Justia Law

Defendants own and operate Auto Pro repair shops in Warren and Troy, Michigan. Plaintiff was employed as a mechanic at the Warren shop in 2011-2013. Syed manages that shop. The parties disagree about the beginning date of Plaintiff’s employment and his compensation. Plaintiff claimed that he worked 65-68 hours per week and was never paid overtime. He admitted to receiving “a little extra” money on occasion. Defendants claim that Plaintiff never worked more than 30 hours per week. They put forward paystubs and timesheets, indicating that he was paid $300 per week, (30 hours at $10 per hour). Syed stated that he security footage to determine employees’ arrival and departure times, from which he created timesheets. Defendants also submitted an affidavit from a manager, Blue. Blue stated that he did not permit Plaintiff to work after the shop closd to the public. Blue stated that “Plaintiff … never worked over 30 hours per week. The district court granted Defendants summary judgment in a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201. The Sixth Circuit reversed; a plaintiff’s testimony alone may be sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff put forward testimony that contradicted that of Defendants, describing his typical work schedule with some specificity. View "Moran v. Al Basit, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued USBI, alleging retaliation in violation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1514A. Plaintiff was disciplined and fired in retaliation for an email he sent alerting his superiors to unsuitable trades made by a co-worker, Harrigan, to the detriment of Plaintiff’s elderly client, Purcell. The trades occurred while Plaintiff was on disability leave. Plaintiff learned of the trades from his assistant shortly after they were made. He called his supervisor twice to express concern and wrote an email to his supervising principal, criticizing the trades for “destroy[ing]” Purcell’s estate plan. Upon returning, Plaintiff was reprimanded for his email. His superiors threatened his job, placed him on an aggressive “performance improvement plan,” and fired him when he ultimately failed to meet its goals. The jury awarded damages for economic loss and emotional damages, finding that Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he had an objectively reasonable belief that Harrigan committed unsuitability fraud and that his email was a contributing factor in his termination; and that USBI did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have discharged Plaintiff even if he had not sent the email. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff established that he engaged in protected activity. View "Rhinehimer v. U.S. Bancorp Inv.., Inc." on Justia Law

Wheat, an African-American male, began working at the bank in 2001. By 2010, he was a payment processor in the wholesale-lockbox department and functioned as an “auditor” who “double-check[ed] [other] payment processor[s’] work.” In February 2010, Wheat was involved in a verbal altercation with a Caucasian worker, whose work Wheat had checked. Wheat’s employment was terminated because he “violated workplace violence policy … made a threat of physical violence … violated anti-harassment policy and … was in violation of [the bank’s] core values.” The other worker was given only a written disciplinary action, having been deemed a “nonaggressor.” Wheat contacted the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found reasonable cause to believe that violations of the statutes occurred but could not obtain a settlement. The district court rejected Wheat’s claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Ohio Civil Rights Act, Ohio Rev. Stat. 4112.02(A). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Wheat met his less-than-onerous burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination and identified genuine disputes of material fact that preclude a finding that the bank’s stated reasons for firing Wheat were not pretextual. View "Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank" on Justia Law